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Abstract
Fair division of indivisible items is a well-studied topic in Economics and Com-
puter Science. The objective is to allocate items to agents in a fair manner, where
each agent has a valuation for each subset of items. Several concepts of fairness
have been established, and envy-freeness is one of the most widely studied notions of
fairness. Since envy-free allocations do not always exist when items are indivisible,
several relaxations have been considered. Among them, possibly the most compelling
one is envy-freeness up to any item (EFX), where no agent envies another agent after
the removal of any single item from the other agent’s bundle. However, despite sig-
nificant efforts by many researchers for several years, it is only known that an EFX
allocation always exists when there are at most three agents and their valuations are
additive or when all agents have identical valuations.
In this paper, we show that an EFX allocation always exists when every agent
has one of the two additive valuations. We give a constructive proof, in which
we iteratively obtain a Pareto dominating EFX allocation from an existing EFX
allocation.
1 Introduction
Fair division of items among competing agents is a fundamental and well-studied problem
in Economics and Computer Science. We are given a set M of m items and a set N
of n agents with individual preferences. The goal is to allocate items among n agents
in a fair manner. In this paper, we consider the indivisible setting: an item can not be
split among multiple agents. Several concepts of fairness have been considered in the
literature, and one of the most well-studied notions of fairness is envy-freeness. Each
agent i has a valuation function vi : 2
M → R≥0 for each subset of items. An allocation is
envy-free if the utility of each agent’s bundle is at least as much as that of any other agent.
Unfortunately, envy-free allocations do not always exist when items are indivisible. We
can easily see this even with two players and a single item having positive utility for both
of them: one of the agents has to receive the item and the other agent envies her. This
motivates the study of relaxations of envy-freeness.
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1.1 Previous Work
Envy-freeness up to one item (EF1): Budish [8] introduced the notion of EF1,
where no agent i envies another agent j after the removal of some item in j’s bundle.
That is, in an EF1 allocation, agent i may envy agent j, but removing some item from
j’s bundle would guarantee that i does not envy j. Note that no item is really removed
from the envied agent’s bundle, this is just a thought experiment to quantify the envy
that the envious agent has toward the envied agent. It is shown by Lipton et al. [22]
that an EF1 allocation always exists and it can be obtained in polynomial time.
Envy-freeness up to any item (EFX): Caragiannis et al. [11] introduced the notion
of EFX, where no agent i envies another agent j after the removal of any item in j’s
bundle. EFX is strictly stronger than EF1, but strictly weaker than full envy-freeness.
Caragiannis et al. [10] remarked that “Arguably, EFX is the best fairness analog of envy-
freeness for indivisible items.” However, while it is known that EF1 allocations always
exist, existence of EFX allocations is not known except in limited cases. As described
in [11], “Despite significant effort, we were not able to settle the question of whether an
EFX allocation always exists (assuming all goods must be allocated), and leave it as an
enigmatic open question.” Plaut and Roughgarden [23] showed that an EFX allocation
always exists (i) when there are only two agents or (ii) when all agents have identical
valuations. Furthermore, it was shown in [23] that exponentially many value queries may
be required to identify EFX allocations even in the case where there are only two agents
with identical submodular valuation functions. Quite recently, Chaudhury et al. [13]
showed that an EFX allocation always exists for three agents with additive valuations,
that is, vi(S) =
∑
g∈S vi({g}) for any agent i and any subset S ⊆ M . It is not known
whether an EFX allocation always exists when there are more than three agents with
additive valuations.
Recently Chaudhury et al. [10] introduced a relaxation of EFX called EFX with
charity. This is a partial EFX allocation, where all items need not be allocated among the
agents. Thus some items may be left unallocated. There is a trivial such allocation where
no item is allocated to any agent. Clearly, such an allocation is not interesting. Therefore,
the goal is to find allocations with better guarantees. In case of additive valuations,
Caragiannis et al. [10] showed that there always exists a partial EFX allocation where
every agent receives at least half the value of her bundle in an optimal Nash welfare
allocation. In case of general valuations, Chaudhury et al. [14] showed how to find a
partial EFX allocation and a pool of unallocated items P such that no one envies the
pool and the cardinality of P is less than the number of agents.
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1.2 Our Contribution
Our contribution in this paper is to show that an EFX allocation always exists when every
agent has one of the two additive valuation functions. That is, we show the existence
of EFX when the set of all agents N is divided into Nα and Nβ, and every agent who
belongs to Nα has additive valuation vα and every agent who belongs to Nβ has additive
valuation vβ.
Theorem 1. EFX allocations always exist when every agent has one of the two additive
valuations.
As mentioned above, Plaut and Roughgarden [23] showed that EFX allocations always
exist when all agents have identical valuations. Under the assumption that each valuation
is additive, Theorem 1 extends this result in a sense that the number of valuation types
becomes two.
1.3 Related Work
Whereas fair division of divisible resources is a classical topic starting from the 1940’s [24],
fair division of indivisible items has been actively studied in recent years. There are
several studies on EF1 and EFX which are the relaxations of envy-freeness [11, 5, 23,
6, 10, 14, 13]. Another major concept of fairness is maximin share (MMS), which was
introduced by Budish [8]. It was shown in [20] that MMS allocations do not always
exist, and there have been several studies on approximate MMS allocations [8, 7, 1, 4,
20, 18, 17]. In addition, studies finding efficient fair allocations have attracted attention.
Pareto-optimality is a major notion of efficiency. Caragiannis et al. [11] showed that
any allocation that has maximum Nash welfare is guaranteed to be Pareto-optimal and
EF1. Unfortunately, finding an allocation with the maximum Nash social welfare is
APX-hard [21]. There are several studies on approximation algorithms for maximizing
Nash social welfare [16, 15, 12, 3, 17, 2].
There are many real world scenarios where items or resources need to be divided
fairly, e.g., taxi fare division, rent division, task distribution, and so on. Spliddit
(www.spliddit.org) is a fair division website, which offers a fair solution for the divi-
sion of rent, goods, and credit [19]. This website implements mechanisms for users to
log in, define what is to be divided, enter their valuations, and demonstrate fair division.
Since its launch in 2014, there have been several thousands of users [11]. For more details
on Spliddit, we refer to the reader to [19, 23]. Another fair division application is Course
Allocate used at the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania to fairly allocate
courses among students [23, 9].
3
2 Preliminaries
Let N be a set of n agents and M be a set of m items. In this paper, we assume that
items are indivisible: an item may not be split among multiple agents. Each agent i ∈ N
has a valuation function vi : 2
M → R≥0. We assume that (i) any valuation function
vi is normalized: vi(∅) = 0 and (ii) it is monotone: S ⊆ T implies vi(S) ≤ vi(T ) for
any S, T ⊆M . We call valuation function vi is additive if vi(S) =
∑
g∈S vi({g}) for any
S ⊆M .
Throughout this paper, we assume that any valuation function is additive. Further-
more, in our proof of Theorem 1, we consider the situation where there are only two
types of valuation functions vα and vβ. That is, for each agent i, either vi = vα or
vi = vβ. Let Nα be the set of agents whose valuation functions are vα and Nβ be the
set of agents whose valuation functions are vβ. To simplify notation, we denote vi(g)
instead of vi({g}) for g ∈M and use A \ g,A∪ g instead of A \ {g}, A∪{g}, respectively.
We also denote S >α T instead of vα(S) > vα(T ). In a similar way, we use the symbols
<α,≥α,≤α, >β, <β,≥β, and ≤β.
For M ′ ⊆ M , an allocation A = (A1, A2, . . . , An) on M ′ is a partition of M ′ into n
disjoint subsets, where Ai is the bundle given to agent i. Under this allocation, the utility
to agent i is vi(Ai) (agent i’s value for the set of items i receives.)
Several concepts of fairness have been considered, and one of the most well-studied
notions of fairness is envy-freeness. An allocation A is envy-free if for all i, j ∈ N ,
vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj). We say that i envies j if vi(Ai) < vi(Aj). Unfortunately, envy-free
allocations do not always exist when items are indivisible. Thus the relaxations of envy-
freeness have been considered. An allocation A is EF1 if for all i, j ∈ N where i envies
j, ∃g ∈ Aj s.t. vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj \ g). An EF1 allocation always exists even when valuation
functions are not additive and it can be obtained in polynomial time [22]. However, the
notion of EF1 seems to be too weak compared to envy-freeness. Therefore, a stronger
concept of fairness is desirable.
Definition 2. An allocation A is EFX if for all i, j ∈ N ,
∀g ∈ Aj s.t. vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj \ g).
That is, in an EFX allocation, agent i may envy agent j, but removing any item
from j’s bundle would guarantee that i does not envy j. We say that i strongly envies
j if ∃g ∈ Aj s.t. vi(Ai) < vi(Aj \ g). We next define the standard notion of Pareto
domination.
Definition 3. (Pareto domination) For an allocation A = (A1, A2, . . . , An), another
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allocation B = (B1, B2, . . . , Bn) Pareto dominates A if
∀i ∈ N, vi(Bi) ≥ vi(Ai), and
∃j ∈ N, vj(Bj) > vj(Aj).
The existing algorithms for finding an EFX allocation with charity [14] or a 12 EFX
allocation [23] iteratively construct a Pareto dominating EFX allocation from an existing
EFX allocation. We will take the same approach to prove Theorem 1.
In the following, we explain some technical ideas or notions used in the earlier pa-
pers. In what follows in this section, we assume that every agent’s valuation function is
additive, but we do not need the assumption that there are only two types of valuation
functions.
Non-degenerate instances: An instance I is a triple 〈N,M,V〉, where N is a set of
agents, M is a set of items and V = {v1, . . . , vn} is a set of valuation functions. We use
an assumption on instances considered in [13].
Definition 4. An instance I is non-degenerate if for any i ∈ N and S, T ⊆M ,
S 6= T ⇒ vi(S) 6= vi(T ).
Let M = {g1, . . . , gm} and let  > 0 be a positive real number. We perturb an instance
I to I = 〈N,M,V〉, where for any vi ∈ V we define v′i ∈ V by v′i(gj) = vi(gj) +  · 2j .
Lemma 5. (Chaudhury et al. [13]) Let δ = mini∈N minS,T :vi(S)6=vi(T ) |vi(S)− vi(T )| and
let  > 0 such that  · 2m+1 < δ. Then the following three statements hold.
• For any i ∈ N and S, T ⊆M , vi(S) > vi(T ) implies v′i(S) > v′i(T ).
• I is a non-degenerate instance.
• If X is an EFX allocation for I then X is also an EFX allocation for I.
This lemma shows that it suffices to deal with non-degenerate instances to prove the
existence of EFX. In what follows, we only deal with non-degenerate instances.
Minimum preferred set and Most envious agent: We use the notion of most
envious agent introduced in [14]. Consider an allocation X = (X1, X2, . . . , Xn) and a set
S ⊆ M . For an agent i such that S >i Xi, we define a minimum preferred set PX(i, S)
of S for agent i with respect to allocation X as a smallest cardinality subset S′ of S such
that S′ >i Xi. Note that it holds that PX(i, S) >i Xi and Xi ≥i Z for any subset Z ⊆ S
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of size at most |PX(i, S)| − 1 by the definition of the minimum preferred set. Define
κX(i, S) by
κX(i, S) =
{
|PX(i, S)| if S >i Xi,
+∞ otherwise.
Let κX(S) = mini∈N κX(i, S). We define AX(S) for a set S as the set of agents with the
smallest values of κX(i, S), i.e.,
AX(S) = {i ∈ N | S >i Xi and κX(i, S) = κX(S)}.
If κX(S) < +∞, we call AX(S) the set of most envious agents.
Champions: The notion of Champions was introduced in [13]. Let X be an allocation
on M ′ ⊆M and let g ∈M \M ′ be an unallocated item. We say that i champions j if i is
a most envious agent for Xj ∪g, i.e., i ∈ AX(Xj ∪g). When it holds that i ∈ AX(Xi∪g),
we call i a self-champion. Note that AX(Xi ∪ g) 6= ∅ for any agent i since we have
Xi ∪ g >i Xi in a non-degenerate instance. We show the following basic lemma, which
is useful in our argument.
Lemma 6. Assume that i champions j. Then, for any item h ∈ PX(i,Xj ∪ g) and any
agent k ∈ N (possibly k = i), it follows that PX(i,Xj ∪ g) \ h ≤k Xk.
Proof. Since i champions j, we have κX(Xj ∪ g) = κX(i,Xj ∪ g) = |PX(i,Xj ∪ g)|.
Note that we have |PX(i,Xj ∪ g) \ h| = κX(Xj ∪ g) − 1 < κX(k,Xj ∪ g) for any item
h ∈ PX(i,Xj ∪ g) and any agent k ∈ N . This shows that PX(i,Xj ∪ g) \ h ≤k Xk.
Lemma 6 implies the following corollary, which will be used repeatedly later.
Corollary 7. Assume that i champions j. If allocation Y Pareto dominates X, then
for any item h ∈ PX(i,Xj ∪ g) and any agent k ∈ N (possibly k = i), it follows that
PX(i,Xj ∪ g) \ h ≤k Xk ≤k Yk.
3 Existence of EFX for Two Additive Valuations
In this section, we prove Theorem 1. As mentioned in Section 2, our algorithm con-
structs a sequence of EFX allocations in which each allocation Pareto dominates its
predecessor. From now on we consider the case where every agent has one of the two
additive valuations vα and vβ. We can see that if |Nα| ≤ 1 or |Nβ| ≤ 1, then Theorem 1
holds: if |Nα| = 0 or |Nβ| = 0, we obtain an EFX allocation in the way shown in [23].
In addition, if |Nα| = 1 or |Nβ| = 1 (say |Nα| = 1), we first obtain an EFX allocation
X = (X1, . . . , Xn) under the condition that all agents have identical valuations vβ. Then,
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we allocate the bundle with the highest utility in the valuation vα among X1, . . . , Xn to
the agent in Nα and allocate the rest of bundles to the other agents arbitrarily. This
allocation becomes EFX. Thus, we assume that |Nα| ≥ 2 and |Nβ| ≥ 2.
Theorem 8. Let X be an allocation on M ′ ⊆M and let g ∈M \M ′ be an unallocated
item. Then, there exists an allocation Y on S ⊆M ′ ∪ g such that
• Y is EFX, and
• Y Pareto dominates X.
Assuming that Theorem 8 holds, it is easy to show Theorem 1. Indeed, if Y Pareto
dominates X, then we have
∑
i∈N vi(Xi) <
∑
i∈N vi(Yi). In other words, we can strictly
improve the value of potential function ϕ(X) =
∑
i∈N vi(Xi) while keeping EFX. Fur-
thermore, since there are only a finite number of allocations, there are also only a finite
number of values of potential functions. Thus this improvement terminates in a finite
number of steps. Since we can strictly improve the value of potential function if M ′ (M ,
we finally obtain an EFX allocation on M .
Now our goal is to show that Theorem 8 holds. Clearly, if there is an agent i such
that allocating g to i results in an EFX allocation, then we can obtain Y desired in
Theorem 8. For a few special cases, it is shown in earlier papers how to obtain a Pareto
dominating EFX allocation from an existing EFX allocation. For an allocation X, we
define the envy-graph EX , where the vertices correspond to agents and there is an edge
from i to j if i envies j, i.e., Xi <i Xj . The envy-graph was introduced in [22] and the
following lemmas are known.
Lemma 9. (Lipton et al. [22]) Let X be an EFX allocation such that EX has a dicycle.
Then, there exists another EFX allocation Y such that EY is acyclic and Y Pareto
dominates X.
Lemma 10. (Chaudhury et al. [14]) Let X be an EFX allocation on M ′ ⊆ M and let
g ∈M \M ′ be an unallocated item. If agent i champions j and i is reachable from j in
EX (possibly i = j), then there is an EFX allocation Y Pareto dominating X.
Lemma 9 implies that if the envy-graph EX has no sources, then we can obtain Y
desired in Theorem 8. Here, a source is a vertex with no incoming edges. In addition, if
there exists a self-champion, we can obtain Y desired in Theorem 8 by applying Lemma 10
as i = j. We also see that if the envy-graph EX has exactly one source, then we can
obtain Y desired in Theorem 8 under the assumption that EX is acyclic and for any
agent i, there exists an agent j such that j strongly envies i when we allocate Xi ∪ g to
i. To see this, let s be the unique source in EX . Then, by our assumption, there exists
an agent j 6= s such that j strongly envies s when we allocate Xs ∪ g to s. Since agents
except s are not sources in EX and EX is acyclic, j is reachable from s in EX , which
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means that we can apply Lemma 10 to obtain Y . To summarize the discussion so far,
the following lemma holds.
Lemma 11. Let X be an EFX allocation on M ′ ⊆ M and let g ∈ M \ M ′ be an
unallocated item. Then, there is an EFX allocation Y Pareto dominating X in the
following cases.
(1) There is an agent i such that no one strongly envies i to allocate Xi ∪ g to i.
(2) EX has a dicycle.
(3) There is a self-champion.
(4) EX has exactly one source and (1) and (2) do not hold.
Therefore hereafter, we assume that the envy-graph has more than one source, there
are no self-champions, and for any agent i, there exists an agent j such that j strongly
envies i when we allocate Xi ∪ g to i. For any agent i ∈ N , we have Xi 6= ∅ by our
assumption. Thus, by the assumption of non-degeneracy, for any i, j ∈ Nα with i 6= j,
we have Xi <α Xj or Xi >α Xj . Similary, for any i, j ∈ Nβ with i 6= j, we have
Xi <β Xj or Xi >β Xj . We denote Nα = {α0, α1, . . . , αs} and Nβ = {β0, β1, . . . , βt},
where Xα0 <α Xα1 <α · · · <α Xαs and Xβ0 <β Xβ1 <β · · · <β Xβt . Recall that s, t ≥ 2.
In the following, we consider various cases, and in all cases we only change the bundles
of α0 and/or β0. Hence, in order to claim that a new allocation Pareto dominates X, we
only need to check that both of α0 and β0 are not worse off and at least one of them is
strictly better off than in X. Furthermore, the following lemma shows that if the new
allocation Pareto dominates X, we only need to check that α1 and β1 do not strongly
envy α0 and β0, and both of α0 and β0 do not strongly envy each other in order to claim
that the new allocation is EFX.
Lemma 12. Suppose that X ′ is a new allocation Pareto dominating X obtained from X
by changing the bundles of α0 and/or β0. If α1 and β1 do not strongly envy α0 and β0,
and both of α0 and β0 do not strongly envy each other, then X
′ is an EFX allocation.
Proof. Since we do not change the bundles of any agents in N \ {α0, β0} and X is EFX,
there is no strong envy between them in the new allocation. Thus, we only need to
consider strong envy toward α0, β0 or from α0, β0. Since α0 is not worse off than in X
and X is EFX, α0 does not strongly envy N \ {α0, β0}. Similarly, β0 does not strongly
envy N \ {α0, β0}. Finally, if α1 do not strongly envy α0 and β0, then neither do any
agents in Nα \ α0. Similarly, if β1 do not strongly envy α0 and β0, then neither do any
agents in Nβ \ β0.
To sum up, if the new allocation Pareto dominates X, it is enough to check that there
is no strong envy for the six relationships in order to claim that it is EFX.
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Our discussion can be divided into two main stages. In the first stage, we strictly
improve the utilities of α0 and β0 by exchanging a subset of each bundle. Then, the new
allocation will Pareto dominate the previous allocation. However, this change may cause
someone to strongly envy α0 or β0. Thus, in the second stage, we need to reduce the
bundles of α0 and β0 in order to eliminate such strong envy.
3.1 Improvement of the utilities of α0 and β0
In this subsection, we improve the utilities of α0 and β0. For this purpose, we use the
following lemmas that show the relationships between α0 and β0.
Lemma 13. We have Xα0 >α Xβ0 and Xβ0 >β Xα0.
Proof. Note that α1, . . . , αs and β1, . . . , βt are not sources in EX . Since we assume that
EX has more than one source, both of α0 and β0 are sources in EX . This shows that
Xα0 >α Xβ0 and Xβ0 >β Xα0 .
Lemma 14. We have α0 ∈ AX(Xβ0 ∪ g) and β0 ∈ AX(Xα0 ∪ g).
Proof. We first show α0 ∈ AX(Xβ0∪g). Since Xβ0 <β Xβ0∪g, we have AX(Xβ0∪g) 6= ∅,
that is, there exists an agent i ∈ Nα ∪ Nβ such that i ∈ AX(Xβ0 ∪ g). If i ∈ Nβ, since
Xβ0 ≤β Xi <β PX(i,Xβ0 ∪ g), we have κX(β0, Xβ0 ∪ g) ≤ κX(i,Xβ0 ∪ g) = κX(Xβ0 ∪ g).
Thus, β0 ∈ AX(Xβ0 ∪ g) and this contradicts the assumption that there are no self-
champions. Therefore we have i ∈ Nα. Then, since Xα0 ≤α Xi <α PX(i,Xβ0 ∪ g), we
have κX(α0, Xβ0 ∪ g) ≤ κX(i,Xβ0 ∪ g) = κX(Xβ0 ∪ g). Thus, α0 ∈ AX(Xβ0 ∪ g). In a
similar way, we also have β0 ∈ AX(Xα0 ∪ g).
By Lemma 14, Xα0 <α Xβ0∪g and Xβ0 <β Xα0∪g. Hence we can define PX(α0, Xβ0∪
g) and PX(β0, Xα0 ∪ g). We define a new allocation X ′ as follows:
X ′α0 = (Xα0 ∪ PX(α0, Xβ0 ∪ g)) \ PX(β0, Xα0 ∪ g),
X ′β0 = (Xβ0 ∪ PX(β0, Xα0 ∪ g)) \ PX(α0, Xβ0 ∪ g),
X ′k = Xk for all k ∈ N \ {α0, β0}.
Note that by Lemmas 13 and 14, we haveXβ0 <α Xα0 <α PX(α0, Xβ0∪g) andXα0 <β
Xβ0 <β PX(β0, Xα0 ∪g). This implies that g ∈ PX(α0, Xβ0 ∪g) and g ∈ PX(β0, Xα0 ∪g).
Thus g is still an unallocated item in X ′. Figure 1 shows the envy-graph EX , the bundles
of α0 and β0, and an unallocated item g. Figure 2 shows the envy-graph EX′ obtained
by exchanging PX(α0, Xβ0 ∪ g) \ g and PX(β0, Xα0 ∪ g) \ g. The following lemma shows
that α0 and β0 are strictly better off in X
′ than in X.
Lemma 15. We have X ′α0 >α Xα0 >α Xβ0 >α X
′
β0
and X ′β0 >β Xβ0 >β Xα0 >β X
′
α0.
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Figure 1: Envy-graph EX (the edge set of
EX is only partially drawn). The vertical
stripe area is PX(α0, Xβ0∪g) and the gray
area is PX(β0, Xα0 ∪ g).
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Figure 2: Envy-graph EX′ (the edge set
of EX′ is only partially drawn) obtained
by exchanging PX(α0, Xβ0 ∪ g) \ g and
PX(β0, Xα0 ∪ g) \ g in X.
Proof. By the definition of minimum preferred set, PX(α0, Xβ0 ∪ g) >α Xα0 . Fur-
thermore, since α0 6∈ AX(Xα0 ∪ g), we have Xα0 >α PX(β0, Xα0 ∪ g). By combin-
ing these two inequalities, we obtain PX(α0, Xβ0 ∪ g) >α PX(β0, Xα0 ∪ g). We also
see that PX(α0, Xβ0 ∪ g) \ g >α PX(β0, Xα0 ∪ g) \ g as the valuation function is addi-
tive. This means that an agent α0 receives the higher bundle from β0 and passes the
lower bundle to β0 in her valuation. Thus, we have X
′
α0 >α Xα0 and Xβ0 >α X
′
β0
,
and hence X ′α0 >α Xα0 >α Xβ0 >α X
′
β0
by Lemma 13. By symmetry, we also have
X ′β0 >β Xβ0 >β Xα0 >β X
′
α0 .
By Lemma 15, α0 and β0 are strictly better off in X
′ and the other agents do not
change their bundles. Hence, X ′ Pareto dominates X.
3.2 Elimination of strong envy
In this subsection, we reduce the bundles of α0 and β0 in order to eliminate strong envy.
As mentioned in Lemma 12, it is enough to consider strong envy from α1, β0 or β1 to α0
and from α0, α1 or β1 to β0. We consider the following two cases separately.
(i) There is at most only one strong envy from α1 to β0 and from β1 to α0 in X
′.
(ii) There is strong envy both from α1 to β0 and from β1 to α0 in X
′.
3.2.1 Case (i)
Without loss of generality, we assume that β1 does not strongly envy α0 and α1 may
strongly envy β0.
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Case 1: X ′α0 <α X
′
α1. We define a new allocation X
′′ as follows:
X ′′β0 = PX(β0, Xα0 ∪ g),
X ′′k = X
′
k for all k ∈ N \ {β0}.
We will show that X ′′ Pareto dominates X, and X ′′ is EFX.
Since X ′′β0 = PX(β0, Xα0 ∪ g) >β Xβ0 , β0 is strictly better off in X ′′ than in X. In
addition, since X ′′α0 = X
′
α0 >α Xα0 by Lemma 15, α0 is strictly better off in X
′′
than in X. We do not change the bundles of the other agents. Thus, X ′′ Pareto
dominates X. We next show that X ′′ is EFX. By Lemma 12, it is enough to check
that there is no strong envy from α1, β0 or β1 to α0 and from α0, α1 or β1 to β0.
• α1 does not envy α0: By our assumption, X ′′α0 = X ′α0 <α X ′α1 = X ′′α1 .
• β1 does not strongly envy α0: By our assumption, β1 does not strongly envy
α0 in X
′. Since X ′′α0 = X
′
α0 and X
′′
β1
= X ′β1 , β1 does not strongly envy α0 also
in X ′′.
• β0 does not envy α0: X ′′β0 = PX(β0, Xα0 ∪ g) >β Xβ0 . By Lemma 15, Xβ0 >β
X ′α0 = X
′′
α0 . Thus, X
′′
β0
>β X
′′
α0 .
• α0, α1, and β1 do not strongly envy β0: By Corollary 7, X ′′β0\h = PX(β0, Xα0∪
g) \ h ≤k Xk ≤k X ′′k for any item h ∈ X ′′β0 and any agent k ∈ N .
Therefore X ′′ is EFX, and hence we are done in this case.
Case 2: X ′α0 >α X
′
α1. In this case, we can define the minimum preferred set PX′(α1, X
′
α0)
of X ′α0 for α1 with respect to X
′. We define a new allocation X ′′ as follows:
X ′′α0 = PX′(α1, X
′
α0),
X ′′β0 = PX(β0, Xα0 ∪ g),
X ′′k = X
′
k for all k ∈ N \ {α0, β0}.
We will show thatX ′′ Pareto dominatesX, andX ′′ is EFX. SinceX ′′α0 = PX′(α1, X
′
α0) >α
X ′α1 = Xα1 >α Xα0 , α0 is strictly better off in X
′′ than in X. Since X ′′β0 =
PX(β0, Xα0 ∪ g) >β Xβ0 , β0 is also strictly better off in X ′′ than in X. We do not
change the bundles of the other agents. Thus, X ′′ Pareto dominates X. We next
show that X ′′ is EFX.
• α1 does not strongly envy α0: By the definition of the minimum preferred
set, we have PX′(α1, X
′
α0) \ h <α X ′α1 for any item h ∈ PX′(α1, X ′α0). Thus,
X ′′α0 \ h = PX′(α1, X ′α0) \ h <α X ′α1 = X ′′α1 for any h ∈ X ′′α0 .
• β1 does not strongly envy α0: By our assumption, β1 does not strongly envy
α0 in X
′. Since β1 does not change her bundle and X ′′α0 ⊆ X ′α0 , β1 does not
strongly envy α0 also in X
′′.
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• β0 does not envy α0: It holds that X ′′β0 = PX(β0, Xα0 ∪ g) >β Xβ0 . By
Lemma 15, Xβ0 >β X
′
α0 . We also have X
′
α0 ≥β X ′′α0 since X ′′α0 is a subset of
X ′α0 . Thus, X
′′
β0
>β X
′′
α0 .
• α0, α1, and β1 do not strongly envy β0: By Corollary 7, X ′′β0\h = PX(β0, Xα0∪
g) \ h ≤k Xk ≤k X ′′k for any item h ∈ X ′′β0 and any agent k ∈ N .
Therefore X ′′ is EFX, and hence we are done in this case.
3.2.2 Case (ii)
In this case, we have X ′α1 <α X
′
β0
and X ′β1 <β X
′
α0 . Furthermore, by Lemma 15, we
have X ′α1 <α X
′
β0
<α X
′
α0 and X
′
β1
<β X
′
α0 <β X
′
β0
. Thus, we can define four minimum
preferred sets: PX′(α1, X
′
α0), PX′(α1, X
′
β0
), PX′(β1, X
′
α0), and PX′(β1, X
′
β0
). We consider
the following three cases separately.
Case 1: |PX′(α1, X ′α0)| ≤ |PX′(β1, X ′α0)| and |PX′(β1, X ′β0)| ≤ |PX′(α1, X ′β0)|. We de-
fine a new allocation X ′′ as follows:
X ′′α0 = PX′(α1, X
′
α0),
X ′′β0 = PX′(β1, X
′
β0),
X ′′k = X
′
k for all k ∈ N \ {α0, β0}.
We will show that X ′′ Pareto dominates X, and X ′′ is EFX. Since we have X ′′α0 =
PX′(α1, X
′
α0) >α X
′
α1 = Xα1 >α Xα0 , α0 is strictly better off in X
′′ than in X.
Similarly, β0 is strictly better off in X
′′ than in X. Thus X ′′ Pareto dominates X.
We next show that X ′′ is EFX.
• α1 does not strongly envy α0: By the definition of the minimum preferred
set, we have PX′(α1, X
′
α0) \ h <α X ′α1 for any item h ∈ PX′(α1, X ′α0). Thus,
X ′′α0 \ h = PX′(α1, X ′α0) \ h <α X ′α1 = X ′′α1 for any h ∈ X ′′α0 .
• β1 does not strongly envy β0: By symmetry, it is the same as above.
• α1 does not strongly envy β0: Since |PX′(β1, X ′β0)| ≤ |PX′(α1, X ′β0)|, for any
item h ∈ PX′(β1, X ′β0), PX′(β1, X ′β0) \ h is a subset of X ′β0 of size at most
|PX′(α1, X ′β0)|−1. Thus, by the definition of PX′(α1, X ′β0), PX′(β1, X ′β0)\h <α
X ′α1 . Therefore, we have X
′′
β0
\ h = PX′(β1, X ′β0) \ h <α X ′α1 = X ′′α1 for any
h ∈ X ′′β0 .
• β1 does not strongly envy α0: By symmetry, it is the same as above.
• α0 does not envy β0: By the definition of PX′(α1, X ′α0), PX′(α1, X ′α0) >α X ′α1 .
In addition, by Lemma 15, Xα0 >α X
′
β0
. Furthermore, since X ′′β0 is a subset
of X ′β0 , we have X
′
β0
≥α X ′′β0 . Thus, we have X ′′α0 = PX′(α1, X ′α0) >α X ′α1 =
Xα1 >α Xα0 >α X
′
β0
≥α X ′′β0 .
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• β0 does not envy α0: By symmetry, it is the same as above.
Therefore X ′′ is EFX, and hence we are done in this case.
Case 2: |PX′(α1, X ′α0)| ≤ |PX′(β1, X ′α0)| and |PX′(β1, X ′β0)| ≥ |PX′(α1, X ′β0)|, or
|PX′(α1, X ′α0)| ≥ |PX′(β1, X ′α0)| and |PX′(β1, X ′β0)| ≤ |PX′(α1, X ′β0)|. Without loss
of generality, we can assume that |PX′(α1, X ′α0)| ≤ |PX′(β1, X ′α0)| and |PX′(β1, X ′β0)| ≥
|PX′(α1, X ′β0)|. We define a new allocation X ′′ as follows:
X ′′α0 = PX′(α1, X
′
α0),
X ′′β0 = PX(β0, Xα0 ∪ g),
X ′′k = X
′
k for all k ∈ N \ {α0, β0}.
We will show thatX ′′ Pareto dominatesX, andX ′′ is EFX. SinceX ′′α0 = PX′(α1, X
′
α0) >α
X ′α1 = Xα1 >α Xα0 , α0 is strictly better off in X
′′ than in X. Since X ′′β0 =
PX(β0, Xα0 ∪ g) >β Xβ0 , β0 is also strictly better off in X ′′ than in X. We do not
change the bundles of the other agents. Thus, X ′′ Pareto dominates X. We next
show that X ′′ is EFX.
• α1 does not strongly envy α0: By the definition of the minimum preferred
set, we have PX′(α1, X
′
α0) \ h <α X ′α1 for any item h ∈ PX′(α1, X ′α0). Thus,
X ′′α0 \ h = PX′(α1, X ′α0) \ h <α X ′α1 = X ′′α1 for any h ∈ X ′′α0 .
• β1 does not strongly envy α0: Since |PX′(α1, X ′α0)| ≤ |PX′(β1, X ′α0)|, for any
item h ∈ PX′(α1, X ′α0), PX′(α1, X ′α0) \ h is a subset of X ′α0 of size at most
|PX′(β1, X ′α0)|−1. Thus, by the definition of PX′(β1, X ′α0), PX′(α1, X ′α0)\h <β
X ′β1 . Therefore we have X
′′
α0 \ h = PX′(α1, X ′α0) \ h <β X ′β1 = X ′′β1 for any
h ∈ X ′′α0 .
• β0 does not envy α0: By the definition of PX(β0, Xα0∪g), we have PX(β0, Xα0∪
g) >β Xβ0 . In addition, by Lemma 15, Xβ0 >β X
′
α0 . Furthermore, since X
′′
α0
is a subset of X ′α0 , X
′
α0 ≥β X ′′α0 . Thus, we have X ′′β0 = PX(β0, Xα0 ∪ g) >β
Xβ0 >β X
′
α0 ≥β X ′′α0 .
• α0, α1, and β1 do not strongly envy β0: By Corollary 7, X ′′β0\h = PX(β0, Xα0∪
g) \ h ≤k Xk ≤k X ′′k for any item h ∈ X ′′β0 and any agent k ∈ N .
Therefore X ′′ is EFX, and hence we are done in this case.
Case 3: |PX′(α1, X ′α0)| ≥ |PX′(β1, X ′α0)| and |PX′(β1, X ′β0)| ≥ |PX′(α1, X ′β0)|. We de-
fine a new allocation X ′′ as follows:
X ′′α0 = PX′(α1, X
′
β0),
X ′′β0 = PX′(β1, X
′
α0),
X ′′k = X
′
k for all k ∈ N \ {α0, β0}.
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We will show that X ′′ Pareto dominates X and X ′′ is EFX. It follows that X ′′α0 =
PX′(α1, X
′
β0
) >α X
′
α1 = Xα1 >α Xα0 . Similarly, X
′′
β0
= PX′(β1, X
′
α0) >β X
′
β1
=
Xβ1 >β Xβ0 . Thus X
′′ Pareto dominates X. We finally show that X ′′ is EFX.
• α1 does not strongly envy α0: By the definition of the minimum preferred
set, we have PX′(α1, X
′
β0
) \ h <α X ′α1 for any item h ∈ PX′(α1, X ′β0). Thus,
X ′′α0 \ h = PX′(α1, X ′β0) \ h <α X ′α1 = X ′′α1 for any item h ∈ X ′′α0 .
• β1 does not strongly envy β0: By symmetry, it is the same as above.
• α1 and α0 do not strongly envy β0: Since |PX′(β1, X ′α0)| ≤ |PX′(α1, X ′α0)|,
for any item h ∈ PX′(β1, X ′α0) ⊆ X ′α0 , PX′(β1, X ′α0) \ h is a subset of X ′α0
of size at most |PX′(α1, X ′α0)| − 1. Thus, by the definition of PX′(α1, X ′α0),
X ′′β0 \ h = PX′(β1, X ′α0) \ h <α X ′α1 . Furthermore, it follows that X ′α1 = X ′′α1
and X ′α1 <α PX′(α1, X
′
β0
) = X ′′α0 . Therefore, we have X
′′
β0
\ h <α X ′′α1 and
X ′′β0 \ h <α X ′′α0 for any h ∈ X ′′β0 .
• β1 and β0 do not strongly envy α0: By symmetry, it is the same as above.
Therefore X ′′ is EFX, and hence we are done in this case.
As a result of our discussion, it follows that Theorem 8 holds. Therefore, Theorem 1
also holds.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that EFX allocations always exist when every agent’s
valuation function is additive and of at most two types. This result extends the result
shown in [23] in a sense that the number of valuation types becomes two under the
assumption that each valuation is additive. Our proof is constructive and our goal is
achieved by iteratively obtaining a Pareto dominating EFX allocation from an existing
EFX allocation. We note that as shown in [13], this method no longer works when there
are three agents with additive valuations. Therefore, a more flexible approach will be
needed to deal with more general cases. The major open problem is whether an EFX
allocation always exists in the general case and we believe that our result is a sure step
for solving this standing open problem. A next step would be to study the case where
every agent has one of the three additive valuation functions or the case where every
agent has one of the two general valuation functions.
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